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ABSTRACT
Recently, embedded systems have not only requirements for
hard real-time behavior and reliability, but also diversified
functional demands, such as network functions. To sat-
isfy these requirements, virtualization using hypervisors is
promising for embedded systems. However, as most of ex-
isting hypervisors are designed for general-purpose informa-
tion processing systems, they rely on large system stacks,
so that they are not suitable for mixed criticality embedded
real-time systems. Even in hypervisors designed for embed-
ded systems, their schedulers do not consider the diversity
of real-time requirements and rapid change in scheduling
theory.
We present the design and implementation of T-Visor, a
hypervisor specialized for mixed criticality embedded real-
time systems. T-Visor supports ARM architecture and re-
alizes full virtualization using ARM Virtualization Exten-
sions. To guarantee real-time behavior, T-Visor provides a
flexible scheduling framework so that developers can select
the most suitable scheduling algorithm for their systems.
Our evaluation showed that it performed better compared
to Xen/ARM. From these results, we conclude that our de-
sign and implementation are more suitable for embedded
real-time systems than the existing hypervisors.
CCS Concepts
•Computer systems organization → Embedded soft-
ware; Real-time system architecture; Real-time operating
systems;
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1. INTRODUCTION
Hypervisors, also called virtual machine monitors (VMMs),
are widely used in desktop and server environments today.
ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-2138-9.
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Basically, these are used for running multiple virtual ma-
chines (VMs) on one physical machine. In the cloud sys-
tems, providers lend their VMs to multiple tenants. This
means different tenants may use the same physical servers.
VMs are independent, so that tenants are not affected by
each other even if they use the same physical server.
Hypervisors have also been applied to embedded systems
recently. However, their purposes are different. One of their
purposes is to construct mixed criticality systems. Require-
ments in recent embedded systems are becoming more com-
plex and various. Traditionally, developers of embedded sys-
tems have employed real-time operating systems (RTOSes).
To satisfy recent complex requirements, general-purpose OSes
(GPOSes), such as Linux, are also becoming popular in
embedded systems. However, complexity of GPOSes of-
ten leads to bugs and security vulnerabilities. In addition,
the majority of GPOSes do not consider real-time property.
Therefore, hypervisors are considered promising to allow co-
existence of mixed criticality systems, such as trusted RTOS
and untrusted GPOS, on the same physical platform.
Much work has been done so far to use hypervisors in
embedded systems. However, many problems have been
left unsolved for practical use. First, little consideration
has been kept for minimizing vulnerabilities in hypervisors
themselves. In embedded systems, we can use some existing
hypervisors designed for desktop and server environments,
such as KVM [6] and Xen [31]. Since they rely on GPOSes to
provide rich functions, their trusted computing base (TCB)
is large. If there are vulnerabilities in hypervisors, a high
criticality VM can be affected by lower-criticality VMs. To
reduce such risks, we should keep TCB of hypervisors small
in mixed criticality systems.
Second, there are often non-negligible cost to introduce
virtualization layers. Generally, applications in virtual en-
vironments tend to perform slower than those in bare-metal
environments. It is due to the overheads of virtual device
drivers to share devices with other VMs, interrupt latency
caused by interceptions of hypervisors, and so on.
In addtiion, there are issues for real-time properties [36].
How to schedule VMs is an important topic to assure hard
real-time requirements. General-purpose hypervisors usu-
ally use schedulers that do not consider real-time require-
ments. Even if hypervisors are designed for embedded sys-
tems, they often provide schedulers that have their own spe-
cific policies. However, real-time scheduling techniques are
often developed for each application or embedded system.
The best-fit scheduling algorithm largely depends from time
to time on their requirements. In addition, scheduling the-
ory is becoming increasingly sophisticated. For such diver-
sity and rapid change, the designs of schedulers of existing
hypervisors are not considered optimal.
In this paper, we focus on mixed-criticality embedded real-
time systems and implement a new hypervisor, called T-
Visor. We designed a hypervisor for ARM processors from
scratch based on our prototype.We have improved its imple-
mentation to run a GPOS as well as an RTOS. We employ
ARM Virtualization Extensions to realize full-virtualization
with low overheads. T-Visor provides independent virtual
environments and unmodified OSes could run on them. We
designed a flexible scheduling framework of T-Visor to en-
able developers to implement their desirable algorithms. Our
implementation is much smaller than existing ARM hypervi-
sors. We evaluated T-Visor with an RTOS and a GPOS. We
compared our hypervisor with Xen using Linux benchmarks.
It revealed that the performance of T-Visor was better than
that of Xen.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• To realize full-virtualization, we fixed bugs of virtual
CPUs and implemented some features of virtual GIC,
which previous version did not have.
• To realize full-virtualization, we implemented features
which previous version did not have.
• We re-designed scheduling framework to become more
flexible.
• We evaluated T-Visor using small benchmarks and real
applications of Linux.
2. ARM ARCHITECTURE
The ARM architecture is one of the famous embedded
architectures. To describe our implementation, we briefly
introduce ARMv7-A architecture. We also introduce the
Virtualization Extensions, hardware support for virtualiza-
tion available in ARMv7-A.
2.1 CPU Mode
The overall view of ARMv7-A processor modes is Figure
1. By the Security Extensions, which is previously called
TrustZone and included in the Virtualization Extensions, a
processor has two security states, Non-secure state and Se-
cure state. These two states are isolated from each other.
In each states, all processor modes are available except Hyp
mode. Applications can switch security state through Mon-
itor mode.
Processor modes are classified into privilege levels (PL).
PL0 is less privileged than PL1, so that a processor in PL0
mode cannot access part of system registers. Therefore, un-
privileged applications on general OSes basically run on PL0
and sensitive functions in OSes run on PL1. In ARMv7-
A with the Virtualization Extensions, the special execution
mode called Hyp mode was added. Hyp mode has higher
privilege level (PL2) than normal modes (PL1&0). Basi-
cally, hypervisors run in Hyp mode and guest OSes run in
PL1&0. Hyp mode has its own system registers which can-
not be accessed from lower privilege levels.
A processor enters Hyp mode when Hyp trap exception is
generated. To generate Hyp trap exception arbitrarily, Hyp
call is available in Non-secure PL1 mode. Hyp Configura-
tion Register (HCR) provides an interface for defining which
Figure 1: ARMv7-A processor modes
Figure 2: Stage-1 MMU and Stage-2 MMU
operations are trapped to Hyp mode. Interrupts also can be
trapped to Hyp mode by setting HCR.
A processor starts in PL1 mode of Secure state. Usually,
a boot loader changes the state into Non-secure state and
boot OSes.
2.2 Memory Management
ARMv7-A has memory managed units (MMUs). Figure
2 shows the overview of the address translation. Usually,
a MMU converts a virtual address (VA) into a physical ad-
dress (PA). Large Physical Adress Extension, which the Vir-
tualization Extensions include, introduce Non-secure PL1&0
Stage-2 MMU. In Non-secure PL1&0 mode, a program can
use Non-secure PL1&0 Stage-1 MMU as usual. Stage-1
MMU translates a VA into an intermediate physical address
(IPA). An IPA is translated into a PA by Stage-2 MMU. This
translation does not need intervention of hypervisors. Data
abort related Stage-2 MMU can be routed to Hyp mode.
2.3 Interrupt Management
ARMv7-A processor has a built-in interrupt controller
called Generic Interrupt Controller (GIC). GIC is parti-
tioned into the Distributor and CPU interfaces.
The Distributor prioritizes interrupts and distribute them
to the specific CPU interface. It also sends a software gener-
ated interrupt to CPU cores. This can be used as an inter-
processor interrupt (IPI).
The CPU interfaces determine whether interrupts have
sufficient priority to cause exceptions. ARMv7-A has two
levels of interrupt exception request outputs, IRQ and FIQ.
The CPU interfaces also determine which level of exceptions
are sent. If an interrupt has sufficient priority, the CPU in-
terfaces send the interrupt to the CPU cores. The CPU can
recognize the interrupt ID and CPU core ID which caused
the interrupt via an interrupt acknowledge (ACK) register.
After handling interrupts, the CPU notifies the end of inter-
rupt (EOI) through CPU interface.
GIC has virtualization support. This introduces Virtual
CPU interfaces. The structure of Virtual CPU interfaces is
the same as that of real CPU interfaces. Therefore, hypervi-
sors can control access to CPU interfaces by just redirecting
them to Virtual CPU interfaces, which helps hypervisors re-
duce Hyp trap of interrupt managing. In Non-secure PL1&0
mode, a program receives virtual interrupts instead of phys-
ical interrupts. VMs also notify EOI through Virual CPU
interfaces. We can link this virtual EOI to physical EOI, so
that a program in Non-secure PL1&0 can send physical EOI
without Hyp traps.
However, the Distributor does not have virtualization sup-
port. Therefore, hypervisors need to trap VM’s accesses to
the Distributor and emulate them.
3. DESIGN PRINCIPLE
The purpose of virtualization in embedded systems is dif-
ferent from that in cloud systems. We focus on mixed criti-
cality embedded real-time systems.
We define the requirements for our hypervisor as follows:
Independency of VMs In mixed criticality systems, trusted
systems and untrusted systems co-exist on the same
platform. Therefore, each VM must be independent,
so that untrusted systems cannot affect trusted sys-
tems.
Small TCB Large TCB often causes several security is-
sues. We need to remove unnecessary large system
resources to improve security.
Selectability of scheduling algorithms There are several
scheduling algorithms to satisfy real-time requirements
in embedded systems. In general, the best scheduling
algorithm depends from time to time on applications.
Therefore, the scheduler should enable developers to
select their algorithms.
Low performance degradation Systems running on vir-
tual machines are necessarily slower than those run-
ning on bare-metal environments. This performance
degradation may affect real-time property. Therefore,
we should carefully design the hypervisor to avoid this
degradation.
Inter-VM communication mechanism In cloud environ-
ments, inter-VM communication is not important be-
cause owners of VMs are different. However, in em-
bedded systems, all VMs on the platform are generally
owned by one tenant. Therefore, developers may need
communication mechanism. For example, a GPOS
providing user interfaces needs to tell commands to
an RTOS.
Figure 3: Traditional Hypervisor Architecture
Based on these requirements, we designed T-Visor.
3.1 ARM Specific Design
T-Visor considers only ARMv7-A architecture with Virtu-
alization Extensions. ARM architecture is one of major ar-
chitectures for embedded systems. In addition, this architec-
ture has virtualization hardware to realize full-virtualization.
This helps T-Visor reduce various execution overheads and
implementation complexity. Therefore, we chose ARMv7-A
architecture.
Supporting other major architectures, such as x86-based
architectures, may be useful. But these architectures often
contain largely different points. To avoid to increase imple-
mentation complexity, we did not consider other architec-
tures.
3.2 Type-1 Hypervisor
Traditionally, there are two types of hypervisor architec-
ture: Type-1 and Type-2 (Figure 3). We designed T-Visor
as a Type-1 hypervisor. A Type-1 hypervisor runs on the
bare-metal environment. Therefore, it need to implement
startup code or device drivers. In contrast, a Type-2 hyper-
visor can use its host OS functions. This hypervisor does
not need to have such hardware-specific functions because
they are usually in the host OS. However, TCB of a Type-2
hypervisor includes its host OS. This does not satisfy one of
our requirements, that TCB should be as small as possible.
In addition, the scheduling of the host OS may affect that
of a Type-2 hypervisor. For these reasons, we adopted the
Type-1 design.
3.3 Full-virtualization
We adopted full-virtualization. Full-virtualization has an
advantage that developers can run unmodified OSes, which
makes it easier to run various types of OSes. There are two
ways to realize full-virtualization, one is to use hardware
support and the other is dynamic binary translation (DBT).
We adopt the former way, as it is relatively low cost. To-
day, there are few processors with virtualization support for
embedded systems. However, we believe that more embed-
ded processors will have virtualization support in the near
future. The latter way does not need special hardware sup-
port. Therefore, this way can be applied to wider range of
processors. However, its cost to implement is much higher
than using hardware support. High implementation cost
tends to introduce software bugs.
Paravirtualization may be another alternative to realize
our objective. Existing approaches often adopt paravirtual-
ization because they do not need hardware support. How-
ever, this needs OS modification. If developers use different
types of OSes or different version of OSes, they need to make
different patches for each OS and verify that each OS runs
correctly.
3.4 Flexible Scheduling Framework
There are a lot of real-time scheduling algorithms and
techniques [37]. Each algorithm or technique has its own
advantages and disadvantages. New approaches are also ap-
pearing year by year. In addition, problems in scheduling
VMs are different from scheduling processes in an OS. For
example, it is difficult to know internal states of VMs. One
of the solutions is modifying guest OSes to notify their states
[34]. However, some developers may hesitate to use this be-
cause they do not want to modify guest OSes. We designed
the scheduling framework to enable developers to implement
as various scheduling algorithms as possible.
3.5 Pass-through Device Access
We assumed that it is less important to share devices
among VMs in embedded systems than general purpose sys-
tems. To share devices among VMs, we need to implement
virtual device drivers. Virtual device drivers involve not only
implementation cost, but also execution overheads. There-
fore, we allowed most of device access pass-through the vir-
tualization layer. The hypervisor captures only access to
forbidden devices.
3.6 Static Resource Allocation
T-Visor assigns physical resources to each VM at boot
time statically. This means each VM cannot use memory or
devices which are not assigned at boot time. The number of
VMs is also fixed. In usual embedded systems, roles of the
systems are clearly defined at boot time. Therefore, it can be
assured that developers can predict how much resources each
VM needs. This helps to reduce implementation complexity
of the hypervisor, which makes the system TCB minimal.
3.7 Keep the Systems Simple
One of the important requirements of embedded systems
is reliability. Generally, it is difficult to verify systems are
free from bugs. One of the ways to reduce bugs is to reduce
functions and modules. Unnecessary functions or modules
may involve errors and vulnerabilities. The simplicity of
the system helps developers check its correctness. It may
also enable to apply formal specification and verification.
Therefore, we did not employ any GPOSes or large libraries.
4. IMPLEMENTATION
Based on the design, we implemented T-Visor in C and
ARM assembly. T-Visor runs in Non-secure PL2 mode.
VMs run in Non-secure PL1&0 mode.
T-Visor does not depend on any other systems except a
boot loader to load T-Visor and kernels of VMs into RAM.
Currently, we use U-Boot. However, after booting, T-Visor
Figure 4: Interrupt handling
does not use any function of U-Boot. Therefore, we can use
other boot loaders.
We now show the key feature of this implementation:
providing virtual environments using ARM Virtualization
Extensions (§4.1), GIC virtualization to manage interrupts
(§4.2), flexible scheduling framework (§4.3), and inter-VM
communication (§4.4).
4.1 Virtual CPU
T-Visor provides virtual environments using ARM Vir-
tualization Extensions. Access to system control registers
must be restricted not to affect the hypervisor or other
VMs. However, most of system control registers in PL0&1
do not affect PL2. Therefore, T-Visor does not implement
traps for access to these registers except Auxiliary Control
Register (ACTLR) and cache and TCM lockdown registers
(L2CTLR, L2ECTCLR).
Memory access is controlled by Stage-2 MMU. If a VM
tries to access forbidden memory area, it leads to Hyp trap.
Developers can configure handlers to these traps. We imple-
mented virtual GIC Distributor (the detail is explained in
the next subsection) using this mechanism.
4.2 Interrupt Control
When IRQ interrupt occurs, the processor enters PL2
mode. T-Visor handles these interrupts. VMs receive these
interrupts as virtual interrupts. VMs use virtual GIC CPU
interfaces. This reduces Hyp trap against access to CPU
interfaces. However, access to GIC Distributor must be
trapped. We implement a virtual GIC Distributor. T-Visor
captures access to GIC Distributor and emulate these access
using the virtual GIC Distributor. T-Visor uses this virtual
distributor to send virtual interrupts. Figure 4 shows the
overview of this mechanism.
4.3 Flexible Scheduling Framework
To allow developers to implement various scheduling al-
gorithms, we provide scheduling function table inspired by
that of RTEMS [10]. From this table, the hypervisor calls
functions on scheduling events. Developers register their
own functions to this function table. The function table is
defined as Code 1.
T_VCPU is the structure for managing a VM. This struc-
ture includes two parameters for scheduling, one is for con-
Code 1: The code of the function table
typedef struct t_schedule_operation {
void (* init )( void );
T_VCPU *(* schedule )( void );
void (* yield)( void );
void (* block)( T_VCPU *);
void (* unblock )( T_VCPU *);
void *(* allocate )( T_VCPU *);
void (* enque)( T_VCPU *);
} schedule_operation_t;
stant parameters (sched_param), the other is for dynamic
states (sched_state). These parameters are held as void
pointers. After the initialization, the hypervisor uses these
parameters only through the table functions. Therefore, de-
velopers can pass pointers to arbitrary data structures and
use these parameters arbitrarily in the scheduling functions.
For example, to implement a fixed-priority (FP) scheduler,
a developer can use sched_param as a fixed priority and
sched_state as a pointer to the wait queue element.
We briefly describe these functions of the function table.
init is an initialization function. This is called once in the
boot time.
schedule decides which VM to run next. This function
itself does not manipulate states of T-Visor. A VM
indicated by the return value should be executed next.
If there is no executable VM, it returns a null pointer.
yield function is called when the current executing VM en-
ters sleep state. For example, a VM executes wfi in-
struction. If a VM yields, the VM must not be sched-
uled until the VM receives a wakeup event.
block function is called when an executing VM are pre-
empted by other VM. A blocked VM should be pushed
to the scheduling wait queue.
unblock function is called when a VM becomes executable.
An unblocked VM should be pushed to the scheduling
wait queue.
allocate function provides a scheduling status parameter
for T_VCPU. allocate is called when T_VCPU is con-
structed. allocate can use sched_param in T_VCPU to
initialize the sched_state.
enque function is called to push a VM to the scheduling
wait queue. Note, a structure of the wait queue can be
an arbitrary data structure. A developer can use not
only a priority queue, but also a simple list, a stack and
so on. An enqueued VM is expected to be scheduled
in the future.
Rescheduling will be done at the end of Hyp call and physi-
cal interrupt handling if rescheduling request flag is set. This
flag is set by user defined functions. This helps developer
control scheduling timing easily.
4.4 Inter-VM Communication
T-Visor provides an inter-VM communication mechanism
built on shared memory pages and virtual interrupts. Figure
5 shows the overview of this mechanism. In the initializa-
tion phase, T-Visor allocates some shared pages to VMs.
Figure 5: The overview of communication between
VMs
Each VM can access to the shared memory freely. To avoid
resource contention, each VM sends a virtual interrupt via
T-Visor.
The shared memory is protected by the translation table.
Therefore, VMs which are not related to the communication
cannot access the shared memory. VMs cannot access other
VM’s memory outside the shared memory. T-Visor sends
a virtual interrupt which has an agreed-upon interrupt ID
number. Therefore, VMs receive only virtual interrupts that
the developers permit.
VMs can remap arbitrary IPAs to the shared memory re-
gion. The page size of shared memory, set in the translation
table, is set 4KB. Therefore, the shared memory is provided
per 4KB and aligned to 4KB boundary.
This implementation permits access to shared memory
without synchronization by virtual interrupt. In our first
implementation, we use a Hyp call to access the shared mem-
ory. When a VM invokes a Hyp call to use a communication
channel, T-Visor checks whether the communication channel
is available or not. If the communication channel is available,
Stage-2 translation table of the VM is modified to permit the
access to the shared memory page. This implementation
prevents access to shared memory without synchronization.
However, modification of the translation table requires TLB
flush. The execution time of the benchmark program on the
first implementation was about 10 times larger than that in
the current implementation.
5. CASE STUDYOF IMPLEMENTING SCHED-
ULERS
In this section, we present a case study of implementing
scheduler to show flexibility of our scheduling framework.
We implemented Earliest Deadline First (EDF) scheduler
on T-Visor. We explain how to implement each function.
5.1 Algorithm
Each VM has period and execution time. Every period,
each VM can run until it uses up its execution time.
Table 1: LOC of T-Visor
Language LOC
C Language 5163
Assembly 1067
Total 6230
EDF scheduler gives the highest priority to a VM which
has the eariest deadline. In this algorithm, a deadline means
time when a next period starts.
5.2 Implementation
We assigned a period and a execution time to each VM.
These parameters are given as sched_param members. Each
VM has a dead line time and a remained execution time in
sched_state. At first, a dead line of a VM is start time of
the system plus its period. This value is set in allocate
function.
EDF scheduler has two priority queue. One queue holds
executable VMs. In this priority queue, VMs are ordered
by their dead line. The other queue holds VMs waiting
for next periods. In this priority queue, VMs are ordered
by their next periods. These priority queue are initialized in
init function. In enque, a VM is pushed into the executable
queue.
In schedule function, it checks waiting queue. If the cur-
rent time is over its next period starting, a VM is pushed
to the executable queue. At that time, its sched_state
is updated to replenish the execution time. Then, sched-
ule function pop the top elements of the executable queue.
schedule function also set a timer event at the time a VM
will expire its execution time. This timer event calls sched-
uler_set_flag function, which lets T-Visor re-schedule.
In block, If a VM uses up execution time, it is pushed
into the wait queue. Otherwise, is is pushed into the exe-
cutable queue. This function also calls scheduler_set_flag
function.
In yield, it just calls scheduler_set_flag function be-
cause a VM is not executable state.
In unblock, If a VM uses up execution time, it is pushed
into the wait queue. Otherwise, is is pushed into the exe-
cutable queue. This function also calls scheduler_set_flag
function.
Through this implementation, we believe that our schedul-
ing framework can support various algorithms. Note, these
functions we implemented do not modify status of VMs in
T-Visor. We completely separate these internal status.
6. EVALUATION
To evaluate whether T-Visor achieves our requirements,
we conducted the experiments on Cubieboard2, which has
dual-core Cortex-A7 CPU, 1GB RAM, MHz Clock, and
100Mb Ethernet controller. The compiler we used to com-
pile T-Visor was GCC 5.3.0. In these experiments, we used
only one processor of Cubieboard2.
6.1 Code Size
We counted LOC of T-Visor using SLOCCount [1]. The
result is shown in Table 1. We also counted Xen 4.4.0 us-
ing SLOCCount. Xen has support for other architectures.
Therefore, we only counted LOC of xen/common directory,
Table 2: Micro architectural latency
Time(µsec) Cycle
Hyp call 6.58 6000
Switch 25.84 23564
Interrupt 7.48 6824
Virtual interrupt 29.71 27094
Figure 6: lmbench result
which does not include code depending on architectures.
The LOC of xen/common directory is 40,633. Our code is
about 6200 LOC in total. This result showed that our de-
sign made the size of our implementation much smaller than
that of Xen.
6.2 Micro Benchmark
We measured latency of micro architectural operations to
reveal the main reasons of overheads caused by T-Visor. The
result is shown in Table 2.
Hyp call is the time of executing an empty Hyp call. This
included the cost of register saving to enter T-Visor from VM
and register restoring to enter VM from T-Visor.
Switch is the cost of switching executing VM. To measure
this, we prepared a Hyp call which performs switching itself.
This included scheduling cost. In this experiment, only two
VMs run and T-Visor used a round-robin scheduler.
Interrupt is the overhead of handling an interrupt. The
time we measured was from starting the interrupt handler
of T-Visor to the end of the interrupt handler of T-Visor.
The interrupt handler of T-Visor makes a virtual interrupt
by writing LR register. After the interrupt handler of the
T-Visor, a VM restarts and processes an interrupt.
Virtual Interrupt is the overhead of emitting a virtual
interrupt using Hyp call. This included the cost of interrupt
handling in a VM. A virtual interrupt is employed in inter-
VM communication. Therefore, this is a rough estimation
of the cost of inter-VM communication.
We believe that these latencies are small enough to run
VMs.
6.3 Linux benchmark
We compared the performance of Linux on T-Visor with
DOM0 Linux of Xen 4.4. We used Arch Linux with Linux
3.15.0 based kernel as a platform. First, we run lmbench3
benchmark suite [22] to evaluate the overheads in a VM. Sec-
ond, we run some real application workloads. Table 3 shows
the detail of the workloads. Basically, these applications are
a subset of the workloads which was used in the evaluation
of KVM/ARM [6]. In these evaluations, we restricted the
RAM size to 256MB and prepared 256MB swap area. We
Table 3: Real application workloads in Linux
Application Description
mysql Evaluate MySQL v15.1 (10.1.12-
MariaDB) using the SysBench [29]
OLTP benchmark with the default
configuration
memcached Evaluate memcached v1.4.25 using the
memslap benchmark with a concurrency
parameter of 4
curl 1G Run curl to download 1GB random
data from the linux server running nginx
in the same local network
untar Running tar to extract Linux v4.4
sources compressed with bz2 compres-
sion
hackbench Running hackbench [11] with 10 process
groups running with 1000 loops to test
scheduler and unix-sockets
Figure 7: Real application performance summary
showed these relative performance, the value normalized by
bare-metal environment.
Figure 6 shows the relative performance of lmbench pro-
grams. In almost all benchmarks, T-Visor performed faster
than Xen. This shows our simple design reduced overheads
in many cases. In some benchmarks, Xen performed bet-
ter than bare-metal and T-Visor. The execution time of
these benchmarks was much shorter than other benchmarks.
Therefore, it seemed in error ranges.
Figure 7 shows the relative performance of real applica-
tion workloads. In all workloads, T-Visor performed better
than Xen. Especially, memcached of Xen was much worse
than that of T-Visor. This application used much memory.
Therefore, it seemed to cause a lot of exception and use swap
frequently.
7. RELATED WORKS
7.1 Other Hypervisors
Xen [5] is one of famous Type-1 hypervisors. Xen needs
a special guest Linux, called DOM0. DOM0 has virtual de-
vice drivers for VMs. Before Virtualization Extensions are
available, Xen can support ARM architectures using par-
avirtualization [13]. Now, full virtualization is available in
Xen on ARM architectures [31].
KVM is a Type-2 hypervisor. KVM is available on ARM
architecture with Virtualization Extensions [6]. KVM/ARM
introduces split-mode virtualization design, in which the hy-
pervisor are split into lowvisor and highvisor. Lowvisor runs
on Hyp mode to set up system registers, trap guest OS in-
structions, and handle interrupts. Highvisor runs on non-
Secure PL1 mode to leverage high-level functions of a Linux
host.
Although these hypervisors are available in ARM archi-
tectures, they depend on Linux. Some bugs on Linux may
influence these hypervisors. On the other hand, T-Visor
does not depend on GPOSes.
In addition, they do not have real time schedulers. How-
ever, there are existing approach to enable real-time schedul-
ing in these hypervisors. Yu et al. [35] have improved real-
time performance of the Xen scheduler. Their new scheduler
aware real-time guest OSes and support priority preemp-
tion. PARFAIT [14] is a real-time scheduling architecture
for Xen. This scheduling architecture focus on guaranteeing
CPU bandwidth for RTOSes. RT-Xen [32, 33] extends Xen
to provide a real-time scheduling framework. This frame-
work enables to implement various scheduling algorithms in
Xen. Scheduling of KVM depends on a scheduler in Linux.
Therefore, the patches for Linux like PREEMPT-RT [25]
may improve real-time performance of KVM.
Quest-V [19] is a hypervisor for embedded systems. It
partitions all physical resources at boot time to avoid traps
into the hypervisor. Their implementation does not sup-
port device sharing. This approach is similar to our device
manage policy. However, it adopts its original scheduling
algorithm and does not consider about selectability. More-
over, its implementation is for x86-based architectures.
Before ARM Virtualization Extensions became available,
paravirtualization approach are often proposed. Suzuki et
al. [28] analyzed ARM architecture and constructed par-
avirtualization hypervisor on ARM architecture. Their eval-
uation showed their hypervisor suffered from various over-
heads. Paravirtualization approach needs to modify kernels.
This increases engineering costs. If developers want to use
new versions of kernels or other types of OSes, they need to
re-implement patches for them.
Except paravirtualization, various solutions were proposed
for co-existence of multiple OSes in ARM architecture. SafeG
[23] is one of them. This uses ARM Security Extension to
run two OSes on the same board. Modified Linux is run-
ning in the non-secure world, and an RTOS is running in
the secure world. Security Extensions is more popular than
Virtualization Extensions. Therefore, this approach can be
applied to more widely platforms than ours. Jing et al. [15]
also proposed a similar architecture using Security Exten-
sions. However, these methods require to modify OSes.
Moreover, these cannot run more than two OSes concur-
rently.
Aashish et al.[2] proposed a Type-1 hypervisor using DBT
approach on the Power architecture. The binary translation
approach does not require any hardware extensions. There-
fore, this approach will be widely applied to other embedded
architectures. However, the engineering cost and execution
overheads become bigger than trap and emulate hypervisor.
Microkernel design hypervisors are often proposed for em-
bedded systems. They leverage similarity between microker-
nels and hypervisors. For example, OKL4 Microvisor [12] is
a variant of the L4 microkernel. This works on ARM proces-
sors and has been deployed to a lot of devices, mainly mo-
bile phones. It is called microvisor because it has features
of both microkernels and hypervisors. Microkernel design
may be more secure than our design because it separates
the functions of the kernel into small processes. NOVA [26],
which is not for embedded systems, focuses on how to im-
plement a secure hypervisor and adopts a microkernel-based
architecture. There is an existing approach to apply for-
mal verification to L4-based kernel [18]. Such an approach
will be applied to microkernel-based hypervisors more easily
than our design. However, it is also known that microker-
nels involve a lot of interprocess communications which make
systems slower. It is worthwhile to consider other types of
hypervisor designs.
7.2 Lightweight VMs
A VM of hypervisors includes a whole OS. It consumes as
much memory and disk space as a normal OS. Emulation
of a whole hardware incurs execution overheads. To moder-
ate these costs, there are some approaches to provide VMs
without hardware level virtualization.
Container-based virtualization, also called operating-system-
level virtualization, is considered as a promising approach
as a substitute for hardware level virtualization by hyper-
visor, for example Linux-VServer [27], LXC [20], FreeBSD
jail [16]. This technique provides a shared OS images and
system libraries. To achieve security isolation, a host OS
provides virtualized internal OS objects. Each VM uses its
own internal OS components. Unlike hypervisor, container-
based virtualization does not require any special hardware
extension. A size of the VM is smaller because OS kernel
is shared. Execution overheads are lower because it does
not need to emulate sensitive instructions. Cells [4] is an
example of container-based virtualization applied to mobile
system.
Drawbridge [24] is an approach to construct light VMs
without virtualization hardwares, which is different from
container-based virtualization. This approach provides pi-
coprocessess to each VM and Windows library OSes run
on these picoprocesses. Drawbridge aims to provide secure
independent environments. This approach does not need
to emulate whole hardwares or to have whole OS images.
Therefore, it achieves low execution overheads and low mem-
ory usage.
However, container-based virtualization and Drawbridge
require host OSes. Container-based virtualization is mainly
implemented in general-purpose OSes. Drawbridge is imple-
mented in Windows. Therefore, these rely on a large TCB.
In addition, as a guest and host OS must be the same, the
developers cannot combine heterogeneous OSes. Note, these
approaches can combine with hardware virtualization. For
example, we can use Linux with LXC on T-Visor.
7.3 Provide VMs without Traditional Hyper-
visors
Exokernel [8] is an OS architecture proposed by Engler
et al. In Exokernel, a kernel provides secure multiplexing
of physical resources and applications manage their own re-
sources. This design enables applications to use physical
resources by their optimized way and reduce overheads to
access physical resources. Each application runs on a li-
brary OS [30]. This OS runs in the same address space as
an application runs. Exokernel does not trust library OSes.
Therefore, faults of applications do not affect other applica-
tions. The scheduling in Exokernel is also flexible. However,
this architecture cannot run traditional OSes directly.
NoHype [17] is an approach to construct virtualized cloud
infrastructure without the conventional virtualization layer.
In this approach, each processor core is dedicated to a single
VM. Therefore, we cannot run more VMs than the proces-
sor cores. Although multi-core processors are common in
embedded systems, it seems inconvenient. In addition, it
assumes that all devices are virtualized in hardware level.
This assumption strongly restricts platforms.
8. FUTURE WORK
8.1 Toward Multi-core Support
We are working on supporting multi-core environments.
We explain some of main features to implement.
First, we need to extend the virtual GIC Distributor.
Some of the resisters in the distributor have different values
among cores. We also need to implement support for soft-
ware generated interrupts. In uniprocessor systems, these
functions are not used. There are peripheral interrupts that
target more than one processor. In bare-metal environ-
ments, after one of targeted processors receives such an in-
terrupt by reading the acknowledge register, other cores re-
ceive spurious interrupts so that only one core receives the
interrupt. However, virtual CPU interfaces do not have such
mechanisms to prevent virtual peripheral interrupts from be-
ing received by more than one processor. Therefore, virtual
Distributor must decide which virtual core should receive
peripheral interrupts. We have implemented some of these
features, but they are not perfect.
wfe instruction may be a problem. This instruction lets
a processor sleep until sev is called in other processors. We
can capture wfe. However, there is no way to capture sev in-
structions in ARMv7-A architecture. This instruction is of-
ten used to implement spin lock in multi-core environments.
Most programs are implemented to work correctly if wfe
does not block the execution. Therefore, T-Visor emulates
wfe as nop in current implementation.
In multi-core system software for ARM architecture, they
usually use Power State Coordination Interface (PSCI). Through
this common interface, system softwares let other CPU start
or let their own CPU suspend. Its implementation is usu-
ally in the boot loader. To access PSCI, system software
must use a Hyp call or a Secure Monitor call (SMC). Hy-
pervisors can capture both Hyp call and SMC. We are now
implementing PSCI to control virtual CPUs of T-Visor.
A case study of our flexible scheduling framework was
shown in this paper. However, we need to evaluate our
scheduling framework for multi-core environments. In multi-
core environments, scheduling algorithms are more diverse
and complex. For example, how to assign virtual cores to
physical cores is one of difficult problems.
8.2 Smart Configuration
We showed our scheduling framework. In this framework,
they need to implement their desired algorithms in C or as-
sembly without any standard libraries. We provide some
data structures of our original library. However, it is not
enough to support implementation. More high-level lan-
guage, such as C++, may be also helpful to implement not
only schedulers but also T-Visor itself.
In addition, developers must configure how to allocate
physical resources to VMs by writing C code. This may
lead to some troubles. We are considered to design Domain
Specific Language (DSL) or configuration scripts.
8.3 Compatibility
Recently, unikernels [21] become attractive in the cloud
environments. This type of OSes are optimized for specific
application like library OS. They do not have several ab-
straction support which traditional OSes have, such as pro-
cess. Unikernels are designed to run on hypervisors, so that
they employ virtual devices. This makes unikernels portable
between different hardwares. Contrast to traditional OSes,
their binary size and execution overheads in applications are
low.
We consider that unikernels are useful in the embedded
systems too. However, these unikernels assume general hy-
pervisors. They use virtual devices. To run unikernels, we
need to implement compatible virtual devices in T-Kernel.
However, it is hard to implement virtual devices from scratch.
We are considering to use Rump Kernel [7] to provide virtual
devices. This provides device drivers of NetBSD. But we do
not decide how to integrate Rump Kernel into T-Visor.
8.4 Security
TCB of T-Visor is much smaller than other hypervisors
because T-Visor does not rely on GPOSes or large libraries.
However, there are still possibility that T-Visor includes
bugs or security vulnerabilities. One way to confirm the
safety of our system is formal verification. Dam et al. at-
tempted to verify an ARM hypervisor [9]. The small code
of T-Visor may enable these approaches.
Another way is testing. Amit et al. [3] have proposed the
validation of hypervisors using the testing environment of
CPU vendors. Their approach is testing VCPUs of KVM
on Intel processor using Intel’s testing facility for physical
CPUs. This approach will be useful for T-Visor to improve
its reliability.
9. CONCLUSIONS
We showed the design and implementation of T-Visor, a
hypervisor oriented for mixed criticality embedded real-time
system. We employed hardware virtualization support to re-
alize simple and fast virtualization. To satisfy various real-
time requirements, we designed a flexible scheduling frame-
work of T-Visor. Our implementation is much smaller than
general-purpose hypervisors. Our experiments showed T-
Visor could run GPOS with lower overheads than a general
purpose hypervisor.
As we mentioned previously, we are working on support-
ing multi-core environments. In multi-core environments,
scheduling algorithms are more diverse and complex. In fu-
ture work, we plan to re-consider our scheduling framework
of multi-core environments. In addition, we plan to improve
other implementation, such as device handling. And then,
we will apply T-Visor to real world applications.
T-Visor is an open source product. Our implementation
is available in https://github.com/garasubo/T-Visor.
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